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University of Illinois
Neo-Realist Theory after the Cold War
Realism is still the reigning tradition in international theory neo realism or structural realism as best 
exemplified m Kenneth N Waltz s Theory o f Internattonal Politics (New York 1979) is widely regarded as a 
major advance on the classical version How the end of the Cold War affects the theory is open to debate The 
Western victory can be seen as vindicating the realist view of politics and the Western balance of power strategy 
based upon i t  At the same time a neo realist like John Mearsheimer1 considers the end to the Cold War 
potentially dangerous upsetting the bipolar balance which Waltz and others portrayed as the best and most 
stable international system possible 2 One could equally well argue that the events of 1989 1990 challenge or 
refute neo realist theory The reality of international politics no longer can be fitted into the structural realist 
paradigm The balance of power has not shifted but disintegrated The old states system no longer survives m 
its earlier form with anarchy its prime structural characteristic States including at least one of the two super 
powers do not consider security against external threat their primary goal or even if they still do they have 
learned that achievmg security by the usual means of capability aggregation is not enough and that the resort to 
self help m the traditional style of Realpolitik under current conditions is impossible and counter productive
Such an argument against realism as refuted by current history though attractive on the surface may be 
mistaken Neo realists have replies available to them (Waltz s writings indicate what some of them might be) 
and anyone knows that the current situation is not final What one revolution does another revolution or a 
counter revolution may undo we do not know how the Soviet and East European experiments will work out at 
home or abroad Meanwhile Realpolitik seems alive and well in the Persian Gulf Historians know that at 
times states including major ones have tried to stop the world of international politics so that they could get 
off and discovered that the exigencies of international politics could not be so easily ignored The French 
experience of 1787 1791 affords a good example More important still to dismiss neo realism as refuted by 
current developments would mean precisely to evade answering the main question that scholars ought to ask 
That question it seems to me is Given that neo realist theory has seemed to apply m international politics 
over at least a large part of its history assuming that recent changes cannot have changed everything m 
international politics how can we separate what remains valid in the theory from what may no longer be so 
retaining the former and dropping or amending the latter?
The question I take it concerns both the history and the theory of international politics The answer I 
want to offer is inescapably a partial one resting on the historical knowledge I have acquired concerning two 
centimes of the history of European international politics from about 1756 to 1945 I offer this answer to 
political scientists with diffidence and an important disclaimer I feel reasonably confident of my hold on the 
historical literature but I come to the political science literature as an outsider Though I have tried to read m it 
fairly widely and conscientiously I may be guilty of the same mistakes superficiality and discovery of the 
obvious that I often feel social scientists make when they dabble in history The answer offered will be 
worthwhile only if analyzing neo realist theory m the light of history serves to produce a point that its 
proponents and critics principally political scientists have not thought of and discussed and dismissed before 
To my knowledge this is the case The mam thesis of this essay is that the end to the Cold War has only 
confirmed a fundamental weakness in neo-realist theory derived from and based on a misunderstanding of the 
history of international politics during the supposed Golden Age of European balance-of power politics from the 
18th to the mid 20th centimes
1 “Back to the Future Instability in Europe After the Cold War International Security IS 1 (Summer 1989) 5 55 The argument of 
this essay rests on a strong restatement of the neo realist position and like it involves sweeping historical generalizations some of 
which I consider doubtful, others untenable
2 E g  A W DePorte Europe between the Super Powers the Enduring Balance (New Haven 1979)
2The Neo-Realist Historical World
Two things particularly strike me in reading neo-real ist theory especially Waltz s work, and some of the 
criticism of it, particularly as represented by Robert O Keohane ed Neo Realism and Its Critics (New York 
1986) First while critics especially Keohane and John G Ruggie offer telling criticisms of the theory they 
do not overturn it (in fact these two do not intend or purport to) Waltz can answer their main criticisms (that 
the theory does not adequately allow or account for change that it falls short of his own requirements for theory 
building that it fails to predict or retrodict satisfactorily in a number of instances or account for the change from 
medieval to modem international politics or recognize the transforming effects of a changed dynamic density of 
interactions in modem times etc ) His reply is that to the extent that these criticisms are trae they do not affect 
the core of his theory The historical question of how the states system with its structural anarchy came to 
develop is of no particular importance for theoretical purposes Structure does not account for everything nor 
does theory explain or predict everything The changes m international politics cited by critics are at the unit 
level only if hierarchy replaced anarchy would its structure be changed Enriching the theory as critics propose 
would only marginally unprove its descriptive accuracy while reducing its theoretical ngor and predictive power
Thus neo realism seems resistant to refutation on the theoretical level At the same time none of the 
critics or proponents of rival theories or approaches to my knowledge challenges the historical generalizations 
Waltz makes 3 Two main assertions are offered in various forms and contexts throughout his work
1 The conduct of states m international politics has always been basically the same All states 
are graded by the structural imperatives of anarchy self help and balance of power or must be if they 
hope to survive and prosper 4
2 States are not functionally differentiated within the structure of international politics Their 
function structurally determined is umform to survive and remain independent through self help 
What differentiates states is solely their position within the system i e their power relative to others 
Domestic society structured by hierarchy and heteronomy enforces upon its units the mandate of 
specialization m order to survive International society structured by autonomy and anarchy imposes 
on its units the mandate not to specialize but to concentrate their resources first and foremost on 
security Only after that requirement is at least minimally met dare they pursue them particular aims 
States ignoring this rale suffer senous consequences (Theory pp 97 99 107 126 et passim )
Two remarks about these historical generalizations
1 Both are asserted as self evident, something everyone knows rather than based on much 
evidence or argument Waltz uses historical evidence drawn mainly from the recent past primarily for 
instantiation and to back up certain other particular theses e g that a bipolar balance is superior to a 
multipolar one or that force has not declined m utility m the recent past His most extended historical 
discussion of how structure shapes outcomes in international politics draws on material from domestic 
rather than international politics m arguing that the different British and American political systems
3 For example Hedley Bull The Anarchical Society (New York 1977) and Martin Wight, Systems o f States (London 1977) emphasize 
potential sources of order more and realpolitical competition less than Waltz yet neither disagrees with his general interpretation of the 
history of international politics Nor so far as I can see do scholars dealing with international politics from the standpoint of games 
theory (Glenn H Snyder and Paul Diesing Conflict among Nations [Princeton 1977] or political economy (e g Robert Gilpin The 
Political Economy o f International Relations [Princeton 1987] and War and Change in World. Politics [Cambridge 1981] or the 
search for ways to promote cooperation under conditions of international anarchy (e g Kenneth A Oye, ed Cooperation under 
Anarchy [Princeton 1985] RobertO Keohane After Hegemony [Princeton 1984] and International Relations and State Powers 
[Boulder Colo 1989] In other words Waltz s view seems a widespread one rather than belonging particularly to realism or neo 
realism However for recent views stressing development and histone change in the nature of international politics see Richard N 
Rosecrance The Rise o f the Trading State (New York 1986) and John A Mueller Retreat from Doomsday (New York, 1989)
4 “The daily presence of force and recurrent reliance on it mark the affairs of nations Since Thucydides m Greece and Kau&lya m India, 
the use of force and the possibility of controlling it have been the preoccupations of international political studies (Waltz, 
Theory p  186 ) Balan ce-of power politics m much the form that we know it has been practiced over the millennia by many different 
types of political units from ancient China and India to the Greek and Italian a ty  states and unto our own day (Waltz, “A Response 
to My Critics in Keohane ed. Neo Realism, p 341 ) Over the centimes states have changed in many ways but the quality of 
international life has remained much the same (Theory p 110) More such statements could be cited
3have histoncaUy produced different kinds of leaders He makes other broad historical assertions along 
with his two main ones contending for example that states prefer to join the weaker of two 
coalitions and that secondary states if they are free to choose flock to the weaker side for it is the 
stronger side that threatens them (!Theory pp 126 27) likewise without adducing historical evidence 
or argument
2 Yet both his mam generalizations concerning the conduct of international politics in history are 
vital to neo realist theory For according to Waltz the sameness and repetitive character of international 
politics over the ages can be explained only by the structure of international politics as he presents it 
The theory also purports to predict and explain the persistent strong tendency toward balance m the 
system (pp 124 128) and to account for the absence of functional differentiation among units and their 
differentiation solely by their position (i e relative power and capability) within it
A Historian s View of the Neo Realist Historical World
Some facts m the history of international politics give the Waltzian picture a pruna facie plausibility (Indeed 
as will be seen certain features of it are generally true of the modem European states system ) All states 
regardless of their ideology domestic structure individual aims etc do claim sovereignty over their territory and 
the exclusive right to the legitimate use of force within it set a high value on their independence and security 
uphold their nght to use force m self-defence try to provide means for it and conduct foreign policy with an eye 
to maintaining their security and independence This is obvious and familiar Nevertheless the more one 
examines Waltz s historical generalizations about the conduct of international politics in the light of history the 
more dubious—m fact, peculiar—they become
Do all states or virtually all or all that really count actually resort to self help m the face of threats to 
their security and independence7 Though Waltz does not clearly define or describe the practice of self help one 
may reasonably infer from the fact that he frequently links it to the balance of power and insists on the primacy 
of power and the structural role of the potential and actual use of force in international politics that self help 
means the potential or actual use of a state s own power along with that of other units for compellance 
deterrence and other modes of controlling the actions of one s opponents By Waltz s rules for testing theories 
neo realist theory should correctly predict or retrodict this kind of conduct m international politics throughout 
history and Waltz clearly believes it does so
I do not As an historian I cannot construct a history of the European states system from 1756 to 1945 
(the penod m which I feel reasonably expert) compatible with the generalization that most unit actors within 
that system responded to crucial threats to their security and independence by resorting to self help as defined 
above In the majority of instances this did not happen In each major penod in these two centimes most unit 
actors tried to protect their vital interests m other ways For one thing most states most of the time could not 
afford a strategy of self help They were like landowners with valuable property which they knew they could not 
possibly insure first because insurance premiums were ruinously expensive second because against the most 
devastating dangers no insurance policy was available at any pnce and third because the very attempt on their 
part to take out an insurance policy was likely to encourage robbers to attack them 5 Hence the insurance 
policies they took out and mam tamed m the form of armed forces alliances and diplomacy were m tended to 
protect against minor nsks and deter casual attacks or vandalism with the full knowledge that if something 
more senous threatened another recourse would be necessary
Other strategies were available and often tned One commonly employed was to hide This could take 
various forms—simply ignoring the threat or declaring neutrality m a general crisis possibly approaching other 
states on one or both sides of a quarrel to get them to guarantee it, trying to withdraw into isolation assuming a
5 A classic example of this can be found in the origins of the War of the Austrian Succession in 1740 The Habsburg monarch and 
German Emperor Charles VI had spent years of costly diplomacy trying to insure the rights of his daughter Mana Theresa to inhent 
his Austrian lands against any challenge to the succession on his death getting all interested powers including Prussia formally to 
endorse the so-called Pragmatic Sanction of her title. Frederick II of Prussia seeing Charles rely on this insurance policy immediately 
seized Austrian Silesia when he and Mana Theresa acceded to their thrones in 1740 ¡and France and Bavaria quickly joined in the attack 
on Austna
i
4purely defensive position in the hope that the storm would blow over or usually as a later or last resort 
seeking protection from some other power or powers m exchange for diplomatic services friendship or non 
military support without joining that power or powers as an ally or committing itself to any use of force on its 
part6 A less common strategy but not unusual or unknown was to transcend, i e to attempt to surmount 
international anarchy and go beyond the normal limits of conflictual politics by striving for an international 
consensus or formal agreement on norms rules and procedures to solve the problem end the threat and prevent 
its recurrence Efforts of this kind were made m every era of these centuries Another strategy was 
bandwagomng i e joining the stronger side for the sake of protection even if this meant insecurity vis a vis 
the protecting power and a certain sacrifice of independence Against the views of some (e g Waltz and 
Stephen M Walt7) I see bandwagomng as historically more common than balancing particularly by smaller 
powers Finally comes the strategy which according to Waltz and others is dominant and structural m 
international politics resorting to self help by balancing against an actual or potential hegemon Once again 
contrary to the view of many scholars including historians I see this as having been relatively rare and often a 
fallback policy or last resort
A concrete example serves to illustrate these different strategies in practice the crisis m Germany (the Holy 
Roman Empire) caused by the Austrian Emperor Joseph II s attempt m 1785 to carry through the exchange of 
the Austrian Netherlands (Belgium) for Bavana8 Almost all German states and principalities saw in this move 
a grave threat to the German balance (which incidentally they mainly conceived not m terms of a balance of 
power but of a balance of rights and claims within a framework of international and local law and custom) The 
proposed move was widely held to threaten everyone s independence and security Many units hid, i e simply 
ignored the issue or remained neutral even though they knew the outcome might affect them critically Some 
balanced Prussia and Hanover old rivals joined to exploit an idea already current, that of form mg a Protestant 
League of Princes to check the Catholic Emperor and his ecclesiastical princely clients Some after initially 
hiding out and then seeing that Joseph would lose his nerve bandwagoned by joining the winning Prussian side 
But some also tried to transcend i e certain lesser princes attempted to form a union of smaller states not to 
stop Prussia or Austria by force (which they knew was beyond their resources) or to balance with either great 
power or against both but to rise above the quarrel reviving and reforming the institutions and constitution of 
the Empire to provide guarantees for everyone s territorial rights and machinery for the arbitration of future 
disputes
This kind of scenano m which different states faced with the same perception of threat adopt diffenng 
strategies to meet it, could be replicated in almost every cnsis throughout the late 18th century the entire 19th 
and the first half of the 20th Waltz s theory therefore cannot accommodate the history of international politics 
as I know it too many facts do not pass through its pnsm
Proving this generalization to be sure is different from illustrating and asserting it. Any demonstration 
would not only require a lengthy historical narrative and analysis impossible in a brief essay but would remain 
controversial even after an analysis given the historical debates surrounding each war and crisis and the 
notorious difficulties of interpreting the motives and strategies guiding historical actors The difficulties of 
deciding which of the four strategies or which combination prevailed m each instance only gets worse if we 
adopt the view of Stephen Walt (above fn 6) that states balance against threats rather than simply against 
power Though this may help neo realist theory explain why states so often join overwhelmingly powerful 
coalitions it also makes it virtually impossible to distinguish between balancing and bandwagomng or to 
determine the real motives of actors since a state while bandwagomng is likely to claim that it is actually 
balancing against a threatening enemy 9 Besides states seldom choose a strategy unconditionally or without
6 What I here call hiding is related in some ways to “buckpassing (see Thomas J Christensen and Jack Snyder Cham Gangs and 
Passed Bucks Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolanty International Security 44 2 [Spring 1990] 137-68 ) However I see 
hiding as broader in scope often involving not just an effort to pass the costs of international politics to someone else but to avoid 
any active participation m it at all
7 The Origins ofAllutnces (Ithaca N Y 1987)
8 The best discussion i s i n K . 0  von Aretin Heiliges Römisches Retch 1776 1806 (2 vols Wiesbaden 1967)
9 An example when Japan and China declared war on Germany during the First World War they were plainly bandwagomng—Japan in 
order to seize German possessions m Asia China to escape isolation and gam British and French protection against Japan and Imperial 
Russia Yet both Japan and China claimed to be balancing against German imperialism
5mixed motives and in particular consider what strategy will yield the 
future alliances political concessions prestige etc)
greatest side payments (territorial gams
However to avoid doing what I accuse Waltz of domg asserting broad historical generalizations without 
evidence let me quickly cite examples of the various competing strategies in the face of threat in four major 
periods of war the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars (1792 ¡1815) the Crimean War (1853 1856) the 
First World War (1914 1918) and the Second World War (1939 1945) Inevitably this will appear dogmatic 
other historians will disagree with some of my interpretations At least a prima facie case against Waltz s 
generalizations should emerge however
The revolutionary and Napoleonic wars are often considered a classic case of balancing with repeated 
coalitions forming to defeat a hegemon and restore the balance of power This view will not stand examination 
When the First Coalition (1792 97) was initially formed, France though aggressive seemed extremely weak 
and vulnerable Austria and Prussia expected to win easily and smaljer states if they did not hide from the 
conflict or were not allowed to gravitated toward the apparently overwhelmingly superior allied coalition 
(Spam Sardinia Piedmont Tuscany Naples various German states etc ) Once France s real power became 
apparent from 1794 on states began either hiding by leaving the coalition (Prussia, Tuscany and some German 
states) or bandwagonmg by joining France like Spain The same thing happened to the Second Coalition 
(1798 1801) states hid or bandwagoned to the allied side so long as it was winmng to mid 1799 and then 
bandwagoned to France s side from late 1799 on Even Russia a mam founder of the Second Coalition did so 
In every succeeding war from late 1799 to mid 1813 even though France under Napoleon had clearly become 
not only the most powerful Continental state by far but also the most ambitious and insatiable one the French 
led coalition was always larger and stronger than its counterpart In several instances (Britain m 1803 and 1807 
Prussia in 1806 Spain in 1808 Austria in 1809 Russia m 1812) Napoleon organized most of Europe for war 
against a single isolated foe In short, the mam response to Napoleonic hegemony and imperialism by 
European states large and small alike was not balancing but either hiding or bandwagonmg (there were also 
attempts to transcend mamly m the form of trying to transform French conquest and domination into a new 
federal order for Germany and Europe but they proved futile against Napoleon s imperialism and would take too 
long to explain here) Every major power in Europe except Great Britain (Prussia Austria Russia Spam) 
became France s acuve ally for a considerable period during the Napoleonic Wars many smaller states joined his 
system some willingly others under duress Wars continued to break out not because European states 
continually insisted upon trying to balance against the hegemonic power but because Napoleon s insatiable 
ambition and lawless conduct frustrated their efforts to hide or bandwagon Prussia from 1795 to 1806 Spain 
from 1795 to 1808 Austria m 1806-1808 and 1809 1813 and Russia m 1807 1812 all tried benevolent 
neutrality and active alliances with France and found both to be impossible and intolerable10 Even after 
Napoleon s disastrous defeat in Russia m 1812 the Continental coalition formed in 1813 to balance against 
France was smaller and weaker than Napoleon s coalition most of his allies and satellites stuck by him Only 
after Pnnce Metternich s attempt to transcend the crisis by mediating al negotiated peace had failed did Austria 
jom and only after Napoleon was decisively defeated at Leipzig m October 1813 did smaller states bandwagon to 
the now dominant allied coalition
The Crimean War began with a clearly supenor coalition of allies (Britain France the Ottoman Empire) 
confronting a Russia already m political and military trouble No neutral state in Europe considered Russia a 
military threat at that time a number of German states including Prussia, considered Britain and France more 
dangerous Yet Sardinia Piedmont joined the dominant coalition militarily Austria did so politically and even 
Prussia and the German Confederation sympathetic to Russia and wanting only to hide were dragged along m 
supporting the political pressure on the Russians And once again there was a major effort to transcend— 
Austria s attempt to stop the war short of victory by a negotiated settlement producing a new concert and a 
permanent solution to the Eastern question
The distinction between balancing and bandwagonmg is especially difficult to draw m the First World War 
Even if one grants that the initial opponents were balancing against the threat from the other side other states
10 For a brief survey of the evidence see Paul W Schroeder “Napoleon s Foreign Policy A Criminal Enterprise Journal o f  Military 
History 54 2 (April 1990) 147-62
6either chose to hide (Spain Holland, Denmark Sweden Switzerland) or to run to the aid of the victor so as 
defeat their particular enemies and gam at their expense (Turkey Bulgaria, Italy Rumania Greece Japan and 
Chma) As things turned out only two powers jomed the smaller Central Powers coalition (Bulgaria the 
Ottoman Empire) both to a degree under duress more joined the larger allied one (Italy Rumania, Greece 
Japan Chma the United States all the British Dominions) Certain of them especially Italy and Rumania 
clearly intended to bandwagon to the victorious side just at the nght time to share the spoils Moreover one 
cannot overlook attempts by neutrals (the Papal State Sweden Switzerland the United States) and even certain 
belligerents (Austria Hungary and the Russian Provisional Government in 1917) to transcend the conflict by 
promoting a negotiated peace
The pattern is clearer m World War II in Europe Even before the war Germany s growing power and 
political success led to extensive hiding and bandwagomng m Western and Eastern Europe Belgium dropped its 
ties to France and reverted to neutrality Holland Denmark, and Norway not only remained ostentatiously 
neutral but declined even to arm for self defence before they were overrun Chamberlain s appeasement policy 
can be seen as a hopeful attempt to bandwagon with Germany for peace Daladier s abandonment of 
Czechoslovakia can be seen as a desperate attempt to avoid war by hiding The Little Entente a potential 
instrument for balancing broke up before Munich the French Czech Russian alliance collapsed at Munich and 
Poland and Hungary bandwagoned with Germany in despoiling Czechoslovakia Italy despite Mussolini s and 
Ciano s fears moved decisively to Germany s side m May 1939 and the Soviet Union followed in August The 
Poles stood firm against German demands and accepted a British guarantee but steadfastly refused to join a 
balancing alliance with Russia against Germany and essentially pinned their salvation on hiding After France s 
defeat the Vichy regime tried to bandwagon with Hitler s Germany Hungary and Rumania joined his camp and 
when Yugoslavia suddenly reversed its decision to do so it was not in order to balance on the other side but to 
take refuge m neutrality Even neutrals (Sweden Turkey Switzerland, Spam) leaned toward Germany so long 
as the tide of war was going Hitler s way After the tide turned m 1941 1942 states began bandwagomng with 
Hitler s enemies many joining the United Nations even Franco s Spain and Perón s Argentina finally leaning 
toward the Allies and Fascist Italy trying to do an 18th century volte face and join them
Thus even if one allows room for differences of interpretation Waltz s generalizations about the 
repetitiveness of strategy and the prevalence of balancing in international politics do not hold up historically 
His second generalization that states in the international system are differentiated not by their functions but 
only by their power position within the structure similarly breaks down In every period small middle sized 
and great powers alike defined their place within the system not simply by their power even relative to other 
adjacent units but also often mainly on the basis of specific systemic functions They claimed that is to do 
certain important things or fill vital roles within the international system as no other unit could do or do as well 
and asked others to support defend or follow them on these grounds These claims were not just propaganda or 
window dressing Discussion and debate over the functions and roles of individual actors within the 
international system whether these roles were necessary and justified and how well the actors were fulfilling 
them went on constantly as they still do and formed the basis of many decisions and actions Once again a 
detailed proof of this assertion would spring the bounds of this essay but some examples drawn from the early 
19th century will illustrate what I mean
Britain claimed for most of this period to be uniquely qualified by virtue of geography history and 
economic development to be the holder of the European balance protecting small states promoting 
constitutional liberty encouraging commerce and preserving peace
Russia envisioned and proclaimed itself throughout the first half of the 19th century as the 
guardian of the monarchical order in Europe ready to defend everyone against revolution and smaller 
states against threats or domination by great powers
The Low Countries were valued by Britain as a bamer against French expansion by Austria 
Prussia and the lesser German states as a link between Britain and Central Europe
Switzerland was deliberately established as a neutral state under jomt European guarantee so that no 
great power would control the strategic passes between Germany and Italy and France and Austria would 
be separated but have something jointly to watch over
7Denmark and Sweden as neutrals were supposed to control the entrance to the Baltic m the joint 
interest of Britain Russia and Germany keeping the old Northern Question from flaring up again
The Papal State was considered indispensable because it provided a political base for the Pope s 
independence as spiritual head of a universal church |
The Ottoman Empire was considered vital for keeping the Straits between the Black Sea and the 
Mediterranean and the routes to India out of the hands of a great power or an ambitious smaller one
The independence of smaller German states was considered v/jital for preventing either German great 
power from controlling Germany outright Britain and some of the smaller states themselves 
considered it also important for promoting the constitutional principle as an alternative to absolutism
The Holy Roman Empire till its destruction in 1803-06 and the German Confederation from 1815 
on were both supposed to regulate and control conflicts within Germany between estates and princes 
Empire or Confederation and individual states Protestants and Catholics and Austria and Prussia
The Ottoman tern tones in southeastern Europe and the Balkan states which gradually emerged 
from their dissolution were seen as useful intermediary bodies between Austna Bntain and Russia.
Any historian knowledgeable m this area could extend this list none I believe could ignore the different 
roles various units played within the international system or treat them as differentiated solely on the basis of 
their relative power position within the structure It is true of course that these special international functions 
often were related to questions of security But this does not mean that these roles can be reduced to a security 
function and considered solely m a balance of power framework any more than the fact that, for example sex is 
related to many of the purposes and goals of mamage (procreation child rearing family life intimacy 
emotional fulfillment communication etc ) permits us to reduce mamage to a mere sexual arrangement For 
an example of how the functions of a state within the international system cannot simply be reduced to its 
power political role one need only look at the Habsburg Monarchy in the 19th century As a great power 
located in the heart of Europe the Monarchy had a vital power political role to play from 1815 on It was 
supposed to control Italy help check Russia and France help preserve the Ottoman Empire and share m the 
organization and leadership of the German Confederation with Prussia all in the interests of a peaceful 
independent, defensively oriented central Europe But besides these security related functions which can 
somehow be subsumed under the elastic heading of balance of power Austna also had another role and 
function widely recognized (though not in formal treaties) and at least as vital for European peace and stability 
especially as the century wore on It was fated by history geography and ethnic composition to be the mam 
area where East and West met and interpenetrated m Europe where the two greatest nationality groups Germans 
and Slavs met and faced each other in an area filled with smaller peoples some neither German nor Slav Here 
as elsewhere in Eastern Europe different cultures religions and nationalities crossed clashed, and influenced 
each other Austna therefore like it or not became the mam seed bed and nursery for one of the most important 
developments m 19th century international history the awakening of the peoples of east central Europe to a 
consciousness of their nationality and a desire for autonomy if not independence Only Austna could 
conceivably manage that process within and without its own borders m the interest of international stability 
only if Austna continued to exist could a struggle between Teuton and Slav for the mastery of Europe be 
avoided These special indispensable functions were imposed by the 19th century international system upon 
Austna Hungary like it or not and when it proved unable to carry them out and other states proved indifferent 
to the problem the stage was set for the destruction of Europe
Thus Waltz s view that states are differentiated within the system solely by their relative power position 
works no better than his view of the repetitive nature of balance of power politics throughout the ages A 
theory of international politics based on these assumptions may be simple parsimonious and elegant it will 
also be unhistoncal unusable and wrong
One can foresee a response perhaps an irritated one from neo-realists Descriptive accuracy Waltz points 
out, is not the goal of theory predictive power is No one contends or need contend that all states always resort 
to self help only that those who count, namely the great powers do and must if they are to remain great 
powers and those who do not, or do not do so successfully endure the consequences The fact that some lesser
8States may try to hide m the interstices of the system or to square the circle by transcending anarchy makes no 
difference to the structure or to the overall pattern of international politics past and present As for the alleged 
differentiation of states by function within the system although Waltz does not implicitly anticipate this 
challenge as he does the other one may reasonably suppose that his reply would be the same one he gives to 
other criticisms The so called differences m function among states within the system are unit level differences 
reflecting variations m size geographic location ethnic make up economic importance or what have you 
Unit level differences affect the system and its outcomes but do not change the essential structure of autonomy 
and anarchy which means that self help power positions and balance of power remain decisive
In short, according to the theory small states that cannot play the power game states that try other 
strategies than self help m the face of security threats and states who have primary roles and functions within 
the system apart from those of balance of power do not count My reaction is Who says so9 Why9 Why should 
one believe this other than in the interests of a particular theory9 Of course a broad theory cannot be 
descriptively accurate in detail or expected to explain predict or (m history) retrodict everything A theorist is 
entitled to ignore someone who thinks he has refuted a theory by citing one or two counter examples But this 
is not my claim It is that this theory in its current form does not illuminate the history of 18th 19th and 
20th century international politics but mstead renders it incomprehensible It gets m the way of new insights 
prevents us from entertaining or developing new hypotheses leads us to overlook or push aside large bodies of 
inconvenient facts it is m short, not progressive but degenerate as a research program m the Lakatos sense It 
not only keeps us from explaining the various strategies pursued as alternatives to balancing and the different 
functions and roles played by various actors within the international system it even keeps us from 
understanding balancing conduct and the operation of the balance of power itself m their histone context It 
obstructs the recognition that the concept of balance of power itself is an histone construct, varying in meaning 
over time conditioned by histoncal circumstances freighted with ideological assumptions 11
Malang the Neo-Realist Model Usable Histoncally
Rather than throwing the baby out with the bathwater the sensible course is to try to retain elements m neo 
realist theory that seem true and broadly consistent with the histoncal record while changing it so as to 
assimilate explain and retrodict facts it now seems unable to accommodate The neo-realist position involves 
an initial assumption leading by a senes of logical inferences to a conclusion The initial postulate of a states 
system in which all units are autonomous implies a condition of structural anarchy this implies in turn the 
pnme importance of survival secunty and independence as the goal of each unit, the necessity of self help and 
a recurrent pattern of balance of power The scheme could be represented as follows with the symbol > 
signifying implies requires leads to
1 2 3 4 5
States System > Anarchy > Primacy of Secunty > Self Help > Balance of Power
I think most histonans would like me see nothing basically wrong with points 1 3 The premise as to 
the nature of the states system since 1648 is widely held points 2 and 3 follow logically from it, and apart 
from the histonan s usual qualifications and quibbles (the modem states system evolved from a very different one 
earlier elements of the old system persisted in the new for a long time there were important differences in the 
functions of states etc ) the theory seems to this point desenptively fairly accurate States did conceive of 
themselves as autonomous units they perceived a condition of anarchy prevailing m international politics and 
they considered secunty and independence as their pnme goal and need. The difficulty as already indicated anses 
m the link between points 3 and 4 The argument presented here has been that in fact most units did not resort
11 For a discussion of the actual divergent meanings of balance as used by 19th century statesmen see my “The Nineteenth Century 
System Balance of Power or Political Equilibrium? Review o f International Studies 15 2 (April 1989) 135 53 Waltz argues 
CTheory p 117) that the principles of Realpolitik noted by Thucydides and expounded by Machiavelli have always governed 
international politics for structural reasons Granted the basic ideas and practices associated with Realpolitik are old The term itself 
however was corned in the middle of the 19th century by a German political theorist, Ludwig August von Rodiau, and as Karl Georg 
Faber has shown Realpolitik at that time represented a particular ideology which had to fight for acceptance against rival outlooks m 
Germany and did not win decisively until Bismarck defeated Austria in 1866 “Realpolitik als Ideologie Historische Zeitschrift 203 
(1966) 1-45
9to self help for the sake of security nor did the system necessarily require balancing practices and promote 
recurrent balances of power At least this did not occur regularly and uniformly enough to constitute the 
system s structure and to provide a satisfactory theoretical account of international conduct A further argument 
has been that states were sharply differentiated m their functions and roles and that their functional differences 
vitally affected the operation of the system
This calls for breaking or loosening the chain of inference between the third point pnmacy of security and 
the fourth resort to self help The break is possible if two assertions are accepted first, that as already noted 
even states bent on maintaining their security do not necessarily resort to self help or engage in balancing 
practices to that end and second that the international system does not necessarily or always operate on the 
basis of balance of power (whatever that protean term may mean)12 Granted these concessions one could 
change the diagram after point 3 as follows
> 4A Hiding
3 Pnmacy of secunty > 4B Transcending
> 4C Bandwagomng
> 4D Balancing
However even if this change were accepted as a better representation of histoncal reality a new problem- 
anses If all these four strategies represent normal foreign policy responses to secunty problems why does the 
overall story and outcome of international politics seem best descnbed m terms of balance of power—the 
formation of alliances and alignments attempts at balancing and deterrence dnves for hegemony and hegemonic 
wars the emergence of new balances of power and their breakdown7 Most scholars histonans and social 
scientists alike have detected this pattern Though I would argue thatj it is incomplete one sided and often 
misleading I concede that it is not imaginary or illusory but to a considerable extent real Its apparent self 
evident character lends pnma facie plausibility to neo realist theory the claim to explain it counts as proof of 
the theory
The answer to the question if strategies for achieving secunty other than balancing were actually more 
common why does balancing seem to dominate in the system overall and determine the mam outcomes7 is 
fairly obvious The four strategies named above though available and actually pursued had unequal chances of 
success and long range results Given elements 1 3 strategies 4A and 4B are inherently difficult to sustain and 
likely to fail either quickly or m the longer run In times of crisis and war or periods of intense balance of 
power competition even small states unless they are remote from the arena of competition find hiding 
difficult They come under great pressure to join one side or the other or end up as pawns and objects of 
compensation in ways familiar to every student Great powers find it even harder to hide indefinitely for equally 
obvious reasons The strategy of transcending is still more difficult, given the notorious obstacles to achieving 
consensus on rules and norms under conditions of anarchy and to maintaining and enforcing any consensus and 
cooperation for an extended period especially in N person games Hence the tendency in international politics 
given points 1 3 is for states to fall back from or out of strategies of hiding or transcending into those of 
balancing or bandwagomng each of which though they differ m aim are realpolmcal strategies and serve to 
produce some sort of power political outcome and new distribution of power The diagram would then be 
modified to look like this
3 Search >4A  Hiding >5A  Quick or > 6  Self help for 5B Slow failure > Secunty >4B
Transcending >5A  5B and 6 as above
I can envision the smile on the neo realists face as he watches the 
The histoncal challenge to the theory and the proposed refinements
mountain labor and produce this mouse 
to it turn out finally to confirm it States
12. For a recent review of balance of power theory and its applications to international polines see the April 1989 issue of the Review of 
International Studies (XV No 2) Certain of the essays including my own deny implicitly or explicitly that the 19th century 
European system was based on a balance of power or operated on it at least for much of the century For discussions of the European 
Concert as a way of rising above balance of power politics see Richard B Elrod The Concert of Europe A Fresh Look at an
Intemauonal System World Politics (1976) 159 74 and Robert Jervis 
Cooperation in Oye fn 4 58 79
From Balance to Concert A Study of International Secunty
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which try other avenues to security besides self help fail and end up driven back to it, self help and balance of 
power are thus revealed as structural in the system
Not so I think Not only does the choice of strategies for security remain a genuinely contingent one not 
dictated by the system s structure The outcomes of the respective strategies are also in this version of the 
theory seen to be contingent derived not from the structure of international politics but from historical 
conditions which can and do change over time The strategies of hiding and transcendence have not failed 
necessarily because of the enduring structure of international politics they have failed contingently because of 
changing and changeable historical circumstances And if these alternate strategies have mostly broken down 
over time and given way to self help via balancing and bandwagonmg that long term failure and breakdown over 
the longer run is no more conspicuous in history than the long term failure of self help and balancing policies 
which have repeatedly led to general systemic breakdown and catastrophic wars I do not contend that failure in 
either case is inevitable but an argument which dismisses alternate strategies for security on the ground that 
they ultimately fail and give way to power politics must cut both ways the failure of power political strategies 
of balancing and bandwagonmg in the long run to prevent international instability and war or promote security 
is at least as obvious
Nor is it legitimate to conflate the short term and the long term failures or breakdowns of alternate 
strategies and lump them together as proof that Realpolitik is inescapable In human affairs long term failure is 
often real short term success and a harbinger of long term success A treatment that produces the remission of 
cancer for some years or a strategy or system that holds off general war for some decades is not a long term 
failure but a triumph The Austrian Emperor Leopold II s failure m 1790 92 to transcend balance of power 
competition m Europe presaged Metternich s success in 1813 1815 the durability of the Vienna system m 
1815 1854 indicates the possibility of a still more durable system from 1945 to 1990 and from 1990 onward 
From 1558 to 1815 Sweden could never hide for long from international competition though it sometimes 
tried Since 1815 Sweden has hidden with entire success Something similar could be said for Switzerland 
Belgium was successfully shielded from international struggle for over eighty years the Ottoman Empire saved 
from collapse for a century Genuine long term transcendence is of course even more difficult Yet Europe 
managed it at least once for about forty years a significant achievement We may be on the way to achieving it 
more durably now
More important than these examples are insights they suggest The fact that attempts at hiding or 
transcending have usually ended sooner or later m failure and a fall back into balance of power competition does 
not prove the inevitability and structural necessity of a balancing strategy It instead tells us something 
important about what balancing strategy often is—a pis aller something states have often chosen or fallen into 
only faute de mieux Statesmen may have balanced or bandwagoned not because the structure of international 
politics limited them to these choices but because they believed that the rules of international politics offered 
no choices but these and believing it made it effectively so Historical conditions may change and so may 
collective mentalities Statesmen in one era may with good reason conclude that any strategy other than balance 
of power is impossible or impractical statesmen of another era may with equal good reason think differently I 
claim that between 1800 and 1813 various states m Europe France excepted gradually were driven to the 
conclusion that the balance of power politics being pursued in Europe die only kind they knew or could 
envision was impossible to make work and intolerable in its consequences Out of despair and necessity they 
came up with an alternative model of politics transcending the balance of power model The world today has 
more compelling reasons to come to that same conclusion and greater ability and institutional capacity to make 
an alternative model work and endure What is wrong with Waltz s neo realism m short is not its analysis of 
the structural basis of international politics in terms of state autonomy anarchy and the pnmacy of security 
but the determinism which insists that this must enforce policies of self help and balance of power that anarchy 
cannot be avoided or transcended
I want to end on a more positive note especially since this essay is not intended to disparage an important 
and stimulating theory The two points urged here that states operating under conditions of structural anarchy 
and the need for security have nonetheless tried other strategies than self help with some success and that 
functional differentiation among states has been widespread and important in international politics may both be 
useful in helping promote cooperation under anarchy Analyses like Robert Jervis s (see fin 11) of how an
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international concert can anse out of balance of power are obviously germane to a situation like that of 1990 
Getting states and leaders to recognize that under the nght circumstances and with the nght general attitudes a 
stable system of norms and rules for great power cooperation can be established constitutes one way of altenng 
the structure of expectations and payoffs m politics and thus lengthening the shadow of the future as Kenneth 
A Oye urges 13 A recognition that differentiation of states by role and function is not only normal but also 
useful m international politics that great powers have in the past not only consented to it but sometimes 
endorsed and even mandated particular roles for particular states with| success could be helpful in meeting some 
of the notorious difficulties of cooperation m N person games One thinks of the specific international roles 
mandated to neutrals and semi neutrals m both the past and present—Belgium Switzerland Finland, Costa 
Rica, etc Functional differentiation can work with great powers as \*jell The German problem was inherently 
manageable m the 19th Century so long as Austria and Prussia were delegated to run German affairs as partners 
while other states made sure they did so without fighting It became unmanageable without conflict when that 
consensus on specific roles broke down Much the same could be said for the Balkan problem and Russia and 
Austria before 1914 Examples could be multiplied
It would not be candid however to give the impression that I am mainly interested m making neo realist 
theory or any other scientific theory of international politics work better Social scientists (at least many of 
them) seek to develop theory useful for deduction and prediction Historians seek a broad synoptic understanding 
of the past pointing toward the future Policy and strategy theorists consider how to lengthen the shadow of the 
future As an historian I wish to sharpen and deepen the shadow of the past Neo realist theory like a good 
deal of other theory in international politics embodies an explicit synoptic understanding of the history of 
international politics as something repetitive cyclical essentially unchanging over time and structurally 
determined My own synoptic understanding is that international politics is inherently evolutionary changing 
m a fundamentally linear direction and capable of transcending its structural limitations The difference m basic 
assumptions and outlook is deep perhaps unbndgeable but I think my assumptions are more sound and 
incidentally more hopeful
13 Explaining Cooperation under Anarchy Hypotheses and Strategies in Oye fh 4 pp 12 14 16 18
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